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Small states: sport and politics at the margin 
 
 
Micro-states, small states and major sports powers 
 
In modern international sport events small states are consistent in their presence 
and also in their marginality. The median population size of the 204 countries that 
participated in the London 2012 Olympic Games was just over 6.6m and almost one 
quarter (47) had a population of less than 1m. Those countries with a population 
below one million accounted for just three Olympic medals in 2012 and the 102 
countries with the smallest population accounted for just 11% (106) of the 962 
medals won. The total number of athletes competing in London was approximately 
10,800 with over half that number coming from just 17 countries. The median size of 
a national squad was 11 and of those countries below the median 70% were, not 
surprisingly, also below the population median of 6.6m. The pattern of marginal 
presence and negligible success is also found in the analysis of the 2010 
Commonwealth Games. Of the 71 countries and territories that took part 52 had 
populations below 10m of which 39 had populations below 1.5m. Thirty-five countries 
did not win a single medal of which 23 had populations below 500,000. The aim of 
this paper is to address this apparent paradox of presence yet marginality. The aim 
will be achieved by the identification of the objectives of small states for participation 
in international sport and investing in elite sport and the analysis of the strategies 
that small states adopt to maximise their ability to achieve their sport and non-sport 
objectives.  
 
In discussions of the objectives of government involvement in sport, especially in 
elite sport, reference is often made, inter alia, to sport’s perceived utility in 
developing and projecting national identity, providing economic benefits through 
regeneration or a strengthened balance of payments, delivering social benefits for 
individuals or communities and in adding to the repertoire of diplomatic resources 
(Arnaud and Riordan 1998, Houlihan 2006, Preuss 2004). However, the identification 
and analysis of governmental objectives is substantially based on the examination of 
the use of sport within a limited number of states whose main characteristics are 
wealth, large population and a long history of independence (notable exceptions 
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include Beckles and Stoddart 1995, Cronin 1999, Sam 2003, and Andersen and 
Ronglan 2012). Yet the vast majority of states that take part in major multi-sport 
events, such as the Olympic Games and the Commonwealth Games, and single 
sport world or regional championships, are ‘small states’.  
 
As a preliminary to the discussion of the two aims of the paper it is necessary to 
examine briefly the concept of a ‘small state’. There is much debate, but little 
agreement on the definition of a small state (Sutton 2011, Maas 2009, Duursma 
1996). Many attempts at developing a precise definition used a combination of 
population, usable land and GDP (for example Taylor 1969, who found a high 
correlation between these characteristics) with the occasional addition of the 
dimensions of remoteness, because so many small states are islands, military 
assets and narrowness of the economic base (Thorhallsson 2000). While agreement 
on objective measures of smallness is not to be found some indication of the 
objective characteristics of the type of states under discussion in this paper is 
required. For the purposes of the following discussion a small state will usually have 
a population below 10 million and a micro-state a population below 1.5m (Vital 1967, 
Bailes 2009). Even if a consensus did exist regarding the objective criteria by which 
a small state and a micro-state could be defined it would still be important to 
acknowledge that ‘smallness’ has significant relative and subjective aspects. For 
example, while North Korea has a population of 25m it is arguably ‘small’ in 
comparison to its regional neighbours China (1352m), Japan (128m) and South 
Korea (50m). Canada (population 35m; per capita GDP US$42,000) is small in 
relation to its southern neighbour (population 314m; per capita GDP US$52,000) 
with the latter having had a substantial impact on the development of elite sport in 
Canada, especially ice hockey and baseball. Furthermore, there is a subjective 
aspect to smallness insofar as a state may adopt the behaviour associated with 
small states because of a self-perception of weakness, for example as is evident 
among some populous sub-Saharan states. While the ambiguity in the 
conceptualisation of smallness need to be acknowledged the problems of definition 
should not be allowed to justify the exclusion of small states from an analysis of the 
international politics of sport policy.  
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In addition to the ambiguity surrounding the concept of smallness there is a similar 
degree of uncertainty regarding the concept of the state which requires brief 
comment. The 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States 
listed four criteria for statehood namely: defined territory; permanent population; 
effective government; and a capacity to enter into relations with other states. 
Dissatisfaction with these criteria was soon apparent but despite considerable 
debate in the intervening years a consensus on a definition has proved elusive. The 
definition of statehood is relevant to this discussion insofar as there are some small 
and micro-states that would not be able to operationalize their sport resources if it 
were not for external support (for example of the Commonwealth Games Federation 
or Olympic Solidarity). Second, there are some territories whose claim to statehood 
is contested and who have been relatively effective in utilising sport to support their 
claims to or aspirations for sovereignty/independence such as Palestine, Kosovo, 
Scotland and Catalonia. Finally, there is the example of Hong Kong which, while 
indisputably part of the People’s Republic of China, aspires to distance itself 
symbolically from the central authority and position itself as a global rather than a 
Chinese region (Lau, 2000, quoted in Ho & Bairner, 2012, p. 353). Although this 
paper will not explore these variations on statehood in detail it is important to bear in 
mind that many of these territories will use sport in a broadly similar way to that 
under discussion for the generality of small states. 
 
 
Domestic and international relations interests of small states 
 
While other organising principles such as culture (Francophone Games), religion 
(Maccabi Games) and sexuality (Gay Games) have been used independent of or in 
conjunction with statehood, in the study of international relations the state is the 
dominant organising concept and unit of analysis and thus reinforces the state as the 
primary unit around which international sport is organised. It is argued in this paper 
that not only do small states face similar political and sporting problems associated 
with recognition, voice and stakeholding and that elite level sport is often used as a 
resource in the pursuit of broader diplomatic goals, but also that the international 
relations and sport policy interests of small states are generally under-researched by 
the academic community. Such interest as has been stimulated in the international 
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relations (IR) of small states was prompted in part by the rapid increase in the 
number of states between the 1960s and 1980s due to decolonialisation. During 
those three decades 36 states were admitted to the United Nations which had 
populations of around 1 million or less. The subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union 
and Yugoslavia provided a further incentive to address the IR of small states. 
However, much early research was often founded on a crude assumption that size 
equated to power and that small states were necessarily weak states (Neumann and 
Gstöhl 2004).  
 
Much of the academic neglect of small states is due to the dominance of the realist 
paradigm in IR which, though centrally concerned with security (a primary concern of 
small states) emphasises (military and economic) capabilities thus tending to 
privilege the study of the more powerful states. Small states are often seen, due to 
their perceived lack of capability, as mere irritants in great power politics (Lewis 
2009) or as part of the supporting chorus of major sports-power politics. When the IR 
of small states has been considered it has often been in terms of the threat they 
pose to the interests of major powers such as Cuba as a threat to the interests of the 
United States or Georgia and the Baltic states as threats to Russia. A parallel 
example in relation to sport would be the evidence of widespread doping and 
government neglect of anti-doping activity in Jamaica and Kenya which can be seen 
as a threat to the traditional prominence of the United States in track athletics. 
 
A secondary aspect of the realist perspective on small states is a tendency to focus 
on what they lack and the ways in which they cope with economic vulnerability and 
political insecurity with some authors seeing vulnerability as the defining political 
characteristic of smallness (Commonwealth Secretariat 1997). As Bishop (2012, p. 
948) notes ‘the idea of vulnerability suggests that development is more fragile, 
ephemeral and potentially threatened than in larger societies’. Reflecting this 
concern the United Nations published a ‘vulnerability index’ (Briguglio 1995) and the 
Commonwealth Secretariat commissioned a report on the impact of economic 
volatility (Atkins et al. 2000). In his review of the evidence on the association 
between population size and vulnerability Payne (quoted in Sutton 2011: 151) 
concluded that ‘it is vulnerabilities rather than opportunities … that come through as 
the most striking manifestation of the consequences of smallness in global politics’. 
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Much the same can be argued in relation to the consequences of smallness in global 
sport. For example, the narrow resource base of many small states, the limited 
domestic market and the concentration of elite sport resources in a narrow range of 
sports contributes to vulnerability and reflect the status of small states in international 
sport policy as predominantly policy-takers rather than policy-makers. It might also 
be argued that a further parallel could be drawn with the tendency of small states to 
specialise in one or two sports (Houlihan and Zheng 2013) and their consequent 
vulnerability to decisions by international sport organisations (such as the IOC, 
Commonwealth Games Federation or major international federations) to remove 
sports from multi-sport events or to change the format of single discipline 
competitions. For example, the decision (later reversed) by the IOC in 2013 to 
remove wrestling from the 2020 Olympic schedule would have been a major problem 
for Azerbaijan who won seven of their ten medals in the sport and Georgia who won 
all but one of their seven medals in the sport. 
 
Bishop (2010) cautions against a deterministic view of vulnerability as vulnerability 
should not be equated with poverty or economic weakness as the examples of 
Singapore, Monaco, Qatar and, though to a lesser extent, Cyprus and Malta 
illustrate. If the definition of state capabilities is broadened to include money then 
realist theory can be used to analyse the capacity of small states such as Qatar (as 
hosts of the 2022 football World Cup), Singapore (host of the 2010 Youth Olympic 
Games) and Abu Dhabi (host of major tennis and golf championships) to challenge 
the traditional dominance of large states (sport powers) as hosts of major sports 
events. 
 
To explore the sport politics of small states purely within the realist paradigm would 
be unwise as there are plenty of examples from mainstream IR of small states 
confounding the assumptions made about them and demonstrating their capacity to 
pursue successfully their interests, often collectively, in the face of major power 
opposition. The 1997 international agreement to outlaw the use of anti-personnel 
mines and the 1998 agreement to establish an International Criminal Court to 
address the issue of war crimes were both achieved in the face of determined 
opposition from major powers, especially the United States, and were not explicable 
in terms of conventional realist IR theorising (Davenport 2002; see also Braveboy-
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Wagner 2010). A similar argument could be made regarding the role of African 
states in isolating South Africa from international sport during the apartheid period 
(Keech and Houlihan 1999). 
 
The neo-liberal paradigm gives less emphasis to capabilities and more to institutions 
and the institutionalisation of interests. The paradigm also takes account of a 
broader range of political actors including non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
such as the IOC, SportAccord, and international federations (IFs), and encourages 
the exploration of the ways in which state interests are pursued beyond the 
concentration on state to state relations. While small states were seen as sharing 
many of the concerns of large states (such as recognition, self-determination and the 
maintenance of the integrity of borders) many had more intense concerns with 
environmental and trade issues as a direct consequence of their narrow economic 
base and their small geographic as well as population size. The neo-liberal paradigm 
supports the examination of the use made by small states of international 
organisations and international policy regimes as arenas within which to pursue their 
national (sport) interests. Of particular relevance to sport policy is the extent to which 
small states can use (either individually of collectively) NGOs and sport policy 
regimes (such as those for anti-doping and development through sport) to pursue 
their sport and non-sport objectives. For example, some states (Norway, Denmark 
and New Zealand for example) have, arguably at least, developed a stronger global 
profile on non-sport issues through their involvement in NGOs and sport policy 
regimes (in relation to anti-doping, integrity and child protection for example). 
However, while neo-liberal institutionalism gives greater scope for the exercise of 
influence by small states it must be acknowledged that most policy regimes, such as 
those for anti-doping and elite sport competition, represent the institutionalisation of 
major power interests.  
 
Social constructivism draws attention to the processes by which perceptions of 
states, for example as vulnerable, sovereign, honest, trustworthy, efficient or corrupt, 
are established and maintained. The awareness of the importance of image is easily 
illustrated. In the early part of the present century Norway used consultants to inform 
its public diplomacy strategy. The outcome was the formulation of four ‘image and 
value platforms … around which coherence in presenting Norway to the world should 
8 
 
be built: a humanitarian superpower/a peacemaker; a society living with nature; a 
society with a high level of equality; [and] an internationalist society/a society with a 
spirit of adventure’ (Batora 2005, see also Leonard and Small 2003). The 
prominence of Norway in sport for development and peace initiatives, the promotion 
of community sport, hosting environmentally sensitive sports events and in anti-
doping action all indicate the scope for sport to play an important part in the 
construction of the four value platforms and the fulfilment of the country’s public 
diplomacy objectives.  
 
According to Lee and Smith (2010, p. 1092) ‘rather than treating smallness as an 
analytical category … it can be understood as a discursive construction’. For many 
small states a key challenge is to achieve recognition of their right to self-
determination and claims to sovereignty. International sports events and 
organisations provide important opportunities for small states to assert and receive 
acknowledgement of their sovereignty. In addition to using sport as an opportunity to 
acquire quasi-legal recognition by other states international sport helps small states 
project a degree of cultural distinctiveness which reinforces their sovereign status. 
As Grant (1997, p. 638) comments ‘nationals of micro-states are often 
indistinguishable from nationals of their larger neighbours at least in terms of race, 
language, religion and tradition’. A number of small states saw the 2012 London 
Olympics as an opportunity to raise their profile (for example Lesotho1, a landlocked 
country in Southern Africa) and/or to promote their claims to statehood (Palestine2 
and Kosovo3). International sport presents many highly visible opportunities for small 
states whose claims to statehood are vulnerable and contested to do things that are 
‘characteristically state-like’ (Grant 1997, p. 656). The Olympic Games and the 
Commonwealth Games give many small and micro states the rare opportunity to 
share a formal symbolic equality of status with the major (sports) powers most 
evident in the opening and closing ceremonies. Additional opportunities for symbolic 
demonstrations of statehood are offered by the international federations that operate 
on a one nation - one vote principle. As Grant (1997: 675) noted, in the struggle that 
many small and especially micro states face to assert and protect their status the 
most convincing evidence of statehood ‘is their admission into international 
organisations’. Sport provides an important arena in which often limited tangible 
resources can be utilised to generate disproportionately effective symbolic strategies 
9 
 
to manage the perception of statehood so as to protect or further claims to de facto 
and de jure recognition (Chong 2010).  
 
The role of some small states as ‘norm entrepreneurs’ (Ingebritsen 2006) is an 
important concept that can be operationalized within both the neo-liberal and social 
constructivist paradigms where much greater account is taken of the diplomatic skills 
of states. Norway’s skill as a norm entrepreneur is evidenced and facilitated by the 
state’s prominence in WADA and in the number of bi-lateral anti-doping agreements 
in which it has been involved (Hanstad forthcoming).  
 
Sport as a resource for small states: soft power and sport 
 
Discussions of the motives for governments to invest in sport – mainly based on 
analyses of major states – often distinguish between domestic and diplomatic 
motives (Houlihan 2007, Horne et al. 2013). Among the domestic motives are urban 
regeneration, nation building, social integration and social control while diplomatic 
motives include expressing support or displeasure for the actions of other states, 
image building and the building of tentative diplomatic links. Whether these pre-
occupations are shared with small states is rarely explored although it is likely that 
small states do indeed share many of the concerns of larger states especially those 
related to improving health and maintaining social stability. However, as many small 
states are ex-colonies it is likely that differentiation from their former colonial power is 
a significant motive for government interest in and funding of elite sport. Furthermore 
for many small states differentiation from the former colonial power is paralleled by 
the need to differentiate themselves from the neighbours who are often culturally 
similar. Many of the small states in the Caribbean are ethnically/culturally 
homogeneous, but less ethnically/culturally distinct from their close neighbours. 
Singapore is an example from Southeast Asia. For these countries differentiation is 
more important than integration. As regards diplomatic or external relations the 
motives may be the same as those of major states, but they are likely to be more 
intense. Diplomatic recognition, security of borders and access to trade are motives 
not peculiar to small states, but they are often much more urgent concerns for the 
reasons previously discussed. With this range of domestic and diplomatic motives in 
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mind it is pertinent to ask what strategies are available to small states to protect and 
advance their interests.  
 
It is possible to identify five potential sport strategies that are available to small 
states in pursuit of their objectives: independent (autonomous); isomorphist/imitative; 
isolationist; collective; and camp follower. While the choice of strategy can be 
affected (and mainly constrained) by many factors the most significant will be the 
degree of internal stability/unity, uncertainty/hostility of the external environment and 
domestic resources. Domestic resources refer not only to wealth, population and 
sport facilities, but also to the nature and depth of the existing sport culture. The 
nature and depth of the sport culture is both a resource for, and a constraint on, 
government and needs to be recognised as retaining a degree of autonomy from the 
state in many countries. For example, the popularity of the sport of shooting 
migratory birds in Malta is a diplomatic embarrassment rather than a diplomatic soft 
power resource.  
 
Few small states have the option of adopting an independent strategy and those that 
do tend to be wealthy such as Abu Dhabi, Qatar, Singapore and Bahrain, all of 
whom have used state resources not only to attract major global sports events in 
football, golf, tennis, rugby, Youth Olympic Games and Formula 1, but also to 
establish a presence in the sporting infrastructure of other major (sports) states 
through the ownership of commercial football clubs (such as Paris St Germain which 
is owned by Qatar Sports Investment and Manchester City which is owned by a 
member of the Abu Dhabi royal family) and by sponsorship of global sports brands 
such as Barcelona FC (shirts sponsored by Qatar) and the Tour de France (Qatar Air 
as the official airline). These small states are able to accrue a degree of status, 
international visibility and influence which eludes many medium range states. 
However, an independent strategy does not have to be based solely on wealth as a 
deeply-rooted and distinctive sporting culture might be an alternative resource. A 
small state such as Ireland, which has a deeply rooted national sporting culture 
(focused on the games of hurling and Gaelic football), continues to pursue, even if 
only partially, an independent strategy (partial because of the state’s increasing 
engagement with Olympic sport and football). Norway similarly has relied on its 
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moral resources to pursue an independent strategy on issues such as youth elite 
sport and anti-doping. 
 
A much more common strategy is one of policy isomorphism/imitation according to 
which states seek to protect their interests by adopting the sporting interests of a 
sports power or a cluster of sports powers. For a large number of ex-colonies, such 
as many Caribbean islands, isomorphism takes the form of retaining selected benign 
colonial links in the form of the sporting culture of the former imperial power – for 
example cricket in the case of many British ex-colonies. Isomorphism can also take 
the form of adopting the sporting culture of a powerful neighbour, such as the United 
States, illustrated by the popularity of the sports of baseball and basketball in the 
Caribbean. Similar patterns of isomorphism can be found among the many small 
states that associate themselves with the Olympic movement and the 
Commonwealth Games. The extent to which isomorphism is a strategic choice rather 
than an unavoidable default position is debatable, but it does give small states 
access to an international stage and often to development funding from the 
resources of Olympic Solidarity, the Commonwealth and the major IFs. A variation 
on the strategy of isomorphism is the camp follower strategy in which small states 
seek to gain advantage by ingratiating themselves with major states or with major 
international sport organisations. The most effective way of pursuing this strategy is 
by making their votes available to states or, more commonly to leaders of IFs, in 
return for which they receive development funding.  
 
The adoption of an isolationist strategy is increasingly rare as states, whether large 
or small, find it difficult to ignore the diplomatic opportunities that involvement in 
international sport offers. It would be hard to imagine a state emulating the 
isolationism of China in the 1960s and 1970s, a period during which it had very little 
international sporting contact and did not participate in the Olympic Games. One of 
the few countries occasionally to consider isolationism as a viable strategy is North 
Korea, but even that state’s leadership seems to have doubts about its utility in 
furthering the state’s interests. The isolationist strategy contrasts with the much more 
common collective strategy where small states cooperate to protect and promote 
their collective interests. The organisation of the Games of Small States of Europe4 
is one example of small states protecting their interests in relation to participation in 
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elite level sport. A second example of a collective strategy is the boycott by 32 
states, many of which were small, of the 1986 Edinburgh Commonwealth Games 
over the issue of apartheid in South Africa. A third example would be the attempt by 
a group of mainly socialist states, including many small states, to organise a multi-
sport event (Games of the New Emerging Forces – GANEFO) to rival the Olympic 
Games in the mid 1960s. However, political issues of the potency of apartheid 
capable of uniting a significant group of countries are less common today. 
 
Accepting that the capacity of most small states to select their strategy is highly 
circumscribed it is important to consider what resources they could utilise and how 
they might deploy them most effectively. Given the general lack of economic, military 
and population resources valued by the realist IR analysts most small states need to 
rely on softer resources and on the careful husbanding of sporting talent thereby 
acknowledging their willingness to test the assumptions of neo-liberal and 
constructivist analysts.  In recent years there has been a growing interest among IR 
analysts in the nature and efficacy of soft power which is a valuable concept in 
understanding the motivations for small states to invest in elite sport not just in the 
hope of developing an Olympic medal contender, but more pragmatically to give 
them access to significant global arenas such as sport NGOs and mega-sports 
events. Small states potentially benefit from the greater awareness of the risks of 
deploying traditional military forms of power which, according to Nye (1990, p. 167), 
has led to ‘intangible power resources such as culture, ideology, and institutions’ 
becoming more important in inter-state relations. Nye (2004, p. 2) defines power in 
terms of the ability to ‘influence the behaviour of others to get the outcomes one 
wants’ and sees soft power, the ability to ‘attract and co-opt them to want what you 
want’, as a complement to, and occasionally a substitute for, the exercise of hard 
power. According to Nye three key sources of soft power are a state’s culture, its 
political values and its foreign policy (Nye 2004, p. 11, 2008, p. 96).5 Although an 
activist foreign policy, utilising the conventional resources of wealth, trade and 
military power, is generally unavailable to small states the other two elements of soft 
power – culture and political values – are more accessible and can be co-produced 
between the state and domestic sport organisations such as the NOC. As Bially 
Mattern (2007. P. 102) comments in contrast to hard power ‘soft power is available 
to any actor that can render itself attractive to another’.  
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As Batoria (2005, p. 1) astutely observes much of contemporary international 
relations takes place in ‘a post-modern world of images and influences’ in which 
there is a greater possibility for small states to shape the international agenda and 
further their domestic interests to a degree that exceeds their limited tangible 
resources. However, in order to take advantage of the opportunities for influence that 
soft power resources provide small states have overcome the problem of their 
invisibility and which requires the availability of some at least of the following 
resources:  
 access to and voice within appropriate global arenas such as IFs, the IOC, 
WADA, UNESCO and Council of Europe (organisations which operate on the 
basis of one country-one vote offer greater scope for influence) or within the 
sporting cultural fabric of one or more major sports powers 
 access to and prominence within highly valued (culturally and politically) 
sports events such as the summer Olympic Games, which is usually achieved 
by the concentration of development resources on a small number of sports in 
which the state hopes to become prominent if not dominant. Examples would 
include New Zealand and rugby union and Jamaica and athletics. 
 ideas, values and behaviour that is attractive to other states 
 a concentrated focus on one or two issues 
 prominent/charismatic advocates/ambassadors, which would normally be 
globally known athletes for example, Alberto Juantorena of Cuba (member of 
IAAF Council), Frankie Fredericks of Namibia (IOC member; member of 
Champions for Peace6) and George Weah of Liberia (UNICEF Goodwill 
ambassador), but which might also be internationally known sporting 
institutions such as the Gaelic Athletic Association 
 
The brief review of Singapore and Ireland illustrates not only the operationalization of 
these requirements, but also how they relate to the sport strategies adopted by two 
small states.  
 
The examples of Singapore and Ireland 
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Singapore (population 5.3m) is a small island city-state located within a complex 
geo-political context. It is also a highly successful economy with the ninth highest per 
capita GDP in 2012. However, the current achievement of the ‘Lion city’ (Williams, 
2009) is hard-won. Colonial rule under the British Empire (Lim & Horton 2012), cruel 
occupation by Japanese Fascists (Lim & Horton 2011), traumatic separation from 
Malaysia (Chen 1988, Horton 2013), direct and indirect influence from, and 
connection with, China (Aplin & Quek 2002), its geographical location of being 
sandwiched between two non-Chinese dominated neighbours - Malaysia and 
Indonesia and its internal lack of resources and intricate racial composition resulted 
in an ‘ideology of survivalism’ within the Singapore government (Ortmann 2009, p. 
29, Long 2012). In terms of foreign affairs, Singapore has adopted a pragmatic 
diplomatic strategy since Lee Kuan Yew’s tenure and the security and development 
of Singapore are the overriding objectives. The independence from, and balance 
between, major powers (in spite of a certain degree of dependence on the US’ 
military power for national defence) have been key features of the People’s Action 
Party’s diplomatic policies (Qie 2005, Wang & Jiang 2008). As a member of the Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM) (MFA 2013), Singapore has played an active role in 
international and regional affairs including economic development and cooperation, 
counter terrorism, disarmament and non-proliferation, environment and peace 
keeping operations and made a great contribution to the establishment of ASEAN. 
The political priorities for the Singapore government may be summarised as the 
maintenance of internal cohesion and the maintenance of its external security and 
sovereignty.  
 
Although Singapore’s hard power resource, economic strength, is a valuable 
diplomatic tool the country has relied to a greater extent on a soft power strategy 
within which sport has become an increasingly important element (Horton 2013). 
During Lee Kuan Yew’s prime ministership (1959-1990) sport mainly served the 
political objectives of social cohesion, racial harmony, national identity and the 
promotion of health and fitness with sporting excellence labelled as ‘foolish and 
wasteful’ (Horton, 2002, p. 251). Indeed Lee Kuan Yew, speaking in 1973, (quoted in 
Horton 2002, p. 251) said that ‘There are no national benefits from gold medallists 
for smaller countries … it is foolish and wasteful for the smaller countries to do it’. 
However, his successor, Goh Chok Tong, took a different view and argued, in 1998, 
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that ‘The contribution of sports to nation building and national pride is far-reaching. 
When Singapore athletes win medals at international sports competitions, they bring 
immense pride and joy to our people. Sporting victories foster national joy and pride’.                                    
(quoted in Horton 2002, p.258). The subsequent publication of ambitious sports 
strategies for example, Sports Excellence 2000 (Ministry of Community Development 
1993), the establishment of a sports ministry in 2000 and the government’s 
considerable investment in the construction of the Sports Hub all took place against 
a background of a distinct lack of enthusiasm for participation in elite sport within the 
country.  
 
The lack of domestic enthusiasm notwithstanding the Singapore state invested 
heavily in a range of elite and international sport initiatives reflecting the 
government’s concern to pursue an independent strategy. The government’s 
strategy to strengthen its profile at major international sports events was supported 
by a concentration on seven priority sports including table tennis, badminton and 
sailing and the offer of substantial financial rewards to medallists. Although its post-
1990 strategy has had only limited success at the summer Olympics the state has 
maintained its ranking in recent Asian Games and seen a substantial improvement in 
its medal total at the Commonwealth Games. A second element in the state sport 
strategy was to attract major sports and sports-related events which would give the 
country an international profile: these included hosting the 117th IOC session in 
2005, hosting the Formula 1 Grand Prix since 2008, hosting the inaugural Youth 
Olympic Games in 2010, and the planned hosting of the Women’s Tennis 
Association annual end of season competition from 2014 to 2018. The third element 
in the strategy is investment in the ‘High Performance Training Hub’ (SSC 2009) 
which has attracted many international teams and star athletes such as Michael 
Phelps and Ronaldinho. The fourth element of the strategy focused on attracting 
international and continental sports federations and organisations to locate in the 
country. One of the first fruits of this strategy was the decision by the International 
Table Tennis Federation (ITTF) to move its Asia Pacific Office and Marketing 
Headquarters to Singapore in 2011 (SSC 2011, p.50). The fifth element of the 
strategy was to seek the appointment of Singaporeans to influential posts in major 
international sport organisations. In addition to Ng Ser Miang, the current Vice 
President of the IOC, there are several Singaporean members on the executive 
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boards or senior committees of the IFs of a number of Olympic sports including 
badminton, canoeing, equestrian, hockey, sailing and table tennis and within the 
World Anti-Doping Agency. The final element is the Foreign Sports Talent Scheme 
(FSTS) introduced in the early 1990s, in table tennis, with the aim of identifying and 
facilitating the migration and naturalization of foreign born athletes. FSTS athletes 
are most common in the Singapore badminton and table tennis squads, but are also 
present in sports as diverse as football, water polo and hockey. Most FSTS athletes 
have come from China, but the Scheme has also attracted athletes from Nigeria, 
Brazil and England. The Scheme has brought considerable success. In the 2002 
Commonwealth Games Singapore won four gold medals in table tennis with a squad 
almost exclusively foreign born; in 2007 FSTS athletes accounted for just under 35% 
of Singapore’s gold medals in the SE Asian Games; the following year a FSTS table 
tennis player won the country’s first Olympic medal since 1960; and in the 2013 
FSTS athletes won all the team table tennis gold medals for their newly adopted 
country.  
 
Although Singapore is far from typical of small states the evidence clearly indicates 
the extent to which the country has been able to incorporate sport into its wider 
diplomatic strategy. With its substantial economic resources Singapore has been 
able to pursue an independent strategy for the maintenance of its sovereignty. With 
reference to the six resources which facilitate the utilisation of sport as a soft power 
resource Singapore was relatively successful in gaining access to positions of 
influence within some major global sport organisations, most obviously the IOC. Ng 
Ser Miang’s senior position within the Olympic Movement also gave the state a 
prominent advocate on its behalf. The hosting of a number of globally significant 
sports events was also a notable resource. Singapore made less use of the 
opportunity to associate itself with a distinctive set of values or issues although it did 
have such an opportunity to raise its profile through the promotion of youth sport by 
virtue of being the inaugural host of the Youth Olympic Games.  
 
However, the strategy has not been without controversy especially in relation to the 
FSTS which has divided domestic opinion with the national media clearly treating 
success by Singapore-born athletes much more positively. There have also been 
domestic expressions of concern that the domination of Chinese-born athletes in 
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some sports, table tennis in particular, is contrary to the implicit policy of ethnic 
balance in Singapore public life. Furthermore, the Scheme has drawn criticism from 
Singapore’s regional neighbours with Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand accusing 
Singapore of employing foreign mercenaries.7 
 
Ireland provides a significant contrast to Singapore. Ireland has a population of about 
4.6m and is culturally homogeneous with over 80% of the population describing 
themselves as Catholic. Until 1922 Ireland was a part of the United Kingdom. Upon 
independence the island of Ireland was divided between the independent Republic in 
the south and six counties in the North East which remained part of the UK. For well 
over 100 years sport has played a central role in Irish politics initially as a focus for 
cultural resistance to the UK and, since independence, as a focus for nation building 
and as a cultural representation of the irredentist claims to Northern Ireland. Unlike 
many other small states for much of its recent history Irish sport, as with much of 
Irish politics in general, has been shaped by the country’s relationship with the UK 
and the division of the island.  
 
Central to the sport politics of Ireland has been, and continues to be, the Gaelic 
Athletic Association (GAA). The GAA was founded in 1884 and was central to the 
campaign of cultural resistance to British rule. The aim of the Association was to 
revive and promote traditional Irish sports such as hurling and Gaelic football and to 
resist the spread of alien English sports such as rugby, football and cricket which 
were referred to as a ‘demoralising and prostrating tide’ (quoted in Mandle 1977: 
420). The network of local clubs established by the GAA fostered a close relationship 
between Gaelic sport and nationalism. Following independence and a brief but bitter 
civil war the government of Ireland was content to let the GAA take the lead in 
organizing the sporting life of the country partly because of the chronic shortage of 
public finance and partly because the GAA club network was reasonably 
comprehensive in its geographical coverage.  
 
In more recent years there has been a marked change in the attitude of the 
government towards sport in general and towards non-Gaelic sports in particular. 
Non-Gaelic sports such as football (soccer), rugby and a range of Olympic sports 
have steadily grown in popularity partly due to decline in the significance of the 
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confrontation with the UK and partly due to membership of the European Union 
which has encouraged a regional outlook within the Irish government. Periodic 
international sporting success has also contributed to a lessening in the dominance 
of the GAA. The success of the Irish football team at the 1988 European 
Championships and at the 1990 and 1994 World Cup finals, Barry McGuigan’s 
success in boxing, Michael Roche’s victory in the 1987 Tour de France and medal 
success at the 1992 Olympic Games all contributed to changes in Irish sport politics.  
 
The international relations that have shaped Irish sport politics are: first, the 
relationship with the UK; second, the relationship with Northern Ireland; third, the 
relationship with the Irish diaspora; and fourth the relationship with other countries, 
especially in the European Union. Lacking the economic resources of a small state 
such as Singapore, Qatar or Monaco Ireland has had to rely more heavily on the 
distinctiveness of their sporting culture and wider range of strategies. The period 
from the establishment of the GAA in 1884 at least to the establishment of the Irish 
Free State in 1922 was characterized by a strategy of confrontational autonomy and 
sporting isolationism directed at Britain as the colonial power. The organization of 
sport in Ireland prior to independence was clearly divided along political lines, with 
the GAA enforcing rules which prevented its members playing ‘British’ sports and 
attempts to undermine the efforts of Unionist associations such as the Irish Amateur 
Athletics Association to promote track and field disciplines. The forceful nationalism 
of the GAA brought it regularly into violent confrontation with the British government. 
There were also many examples of harassment of the GAA by the British 
government such as the attempt to impose a tax on Gaelic sports, interference with 
the organization of transport for major sports events, occasional bans on Gaelic 
sports and police disruption of sports events (de Búrca 1980).  
 
Since independence and the establishment of the Irish Republic in the 26 counties of 
the island of Ireland the focus of Irish sport politics has focused more specifically on 
the relationship with Northern Ireland. However, the strategy of the Irish state 
remained autonomous and defined by irredentism. From 1937 to 1998 the 
constitution of Ireland stated that ‘The territory consists of the whole island of Ireland’ 
(Article 2). Although the constitution was amended in 1998 as part of the process to 
end the civil war in Northern Ireland to remove the claim of the Irish government to 
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the six counties in the North the new constitution still noted the right of ‘every person 
born in the island of Ireland … to be part of the Irish nation’. Paralleling the claim of 
the Irish government to Northern Ireland the GAA operates across all 32 counties of 
the two countries and is a significant cultural and political force within Northern Irish 
politics.  
 
Complementing and reinforcing the pursuit of an autonomous and isolationist sport 
strategy in relation to Britain and more recently Northern Ireland the Irish state 
through the GAA has also pursued a collective strategy aimed at other states with 
large Irish migrant populations particularly the United States and Australia. Up until 
the 1980s Irish sports diplomacy was limited to and defined by the Irish Diaspora and 
was concerned to maintain Irish cultural identity in overseas communities and also to 
support a lobby on behalf of Irish political interests (especially in terms of the 
country’s relationship with Britain and Northern Ireland) in influential host countries. 
 
It is only more recently, since membership of the European Union in 1973 and the 
Good Friday agreement in 1998 which changed the character and intensity of 
nationalist politics with regard to Northern Ireland, that the nature of the Irish sport 
strategy has altered significantly. While an autonomous strategy continues to define 
Irish sports diplomacy it has become less exclusive and isolationist. Irish involvement 
in football and particularly in the Olympic Games has increased steadily in 
prominence both in terms of popular appeal and also in terms of government 
support. 
 
As a small and, for many years, an impoverished state, Ireland demonstrated the 
capacity to define and pursue an independent sport strategy at the domestic and 
international levels. This capacity was the product of the politicisation of culture in 
the anti-colonial struggle with the UK and the integration of cultural and political 
nationalism. The strategy was also shaped by the singularity of Irish political 
objectives namely independence from the UK and a united Ireland. Once those 
objectives had been partially achieved an isolationist sport strategy became far less 
effective in supporting the diplomatic ambitions of the Irish state. However, while the 
Irish strategy has become more conventional it still reflects a considerable capacity 
on the part of the Irish state to determine the nature of strategic change. 
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In contrast to Singapore, Ireland has utilised a different set of resources in its efforts 
to utilise sport as a soft power diplomatic instrument. Ireland does not have a strong 
current voice within major international sport organisations, although Lord Killanin 
was President of the IOC in the 1970s it was a time when Olympic sport was a low 
priority for the GAA-dominated Irish government. Although Ireland has increased its 
involvement in global sports it has not achieved a dominant or even prominent profile 
in any sport with the possible exception of rugby union. The independent and 
isolationist strategy of support for Gaelic sport has proved attractive to other states 
with a large Irish migrant population such as the USA and Australia, although the 
extent to which the prominence that support for Gaelic sport in migrant communities 
affects their host government policy in a way that is favourable to Irish interests in 
unclear.  
 
The brief review of the cases of Singapore and Ireland illustrates the capacity of 
small states to utilise sport for both domestic and international political purposes, but 
they also highlight the constraints on strategy choice even for states that possess 
substantial resources – economic in the case of Singapore and cultural in the case of 
Ireland. However, these two cases, while far from being the only studies of sport as a 
policy resource in small states, draw attention to the lack of research into the sport 
policy objectives of small states, the strategies they develop to pursue their 
objectives and the extent to which they achieve their objectives. 
 
The relative neglect of the study of small states is not just a feature of sport policy 
analysis, but is a characteristic of the study of both domestic politics and 
international relations. In the field of international relations Christmas-Møller (1983: 
39) referred to the ‘benign neglect’ of small states within the IR literature. Although 
Neumann and Gstöhl (2004: 12 and 13) noted a revival in small state studies in the 
1990s they concluded that ‘there has been no continuous flow of research on small 
states’ and that ‘the continued … proliferation of small states … must constitute a 
challenge to social scientists’. Part of the explanation for the relative neglect of small 
state studies in the field of sport policy is due, in part at least, to the sociology of 
knowledge within the field which is dominated and defined by the interests of 
academics in the ‘sports powers’ of western Europe and North America. Within this 
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academic community the study of small states, such as it is, is often confined to the 
sub-discipline of ‘sport for development’ which tends to treat small states as passive 
objects rather than active, or potentially active, subjects in the policy process.  
 
A second explanation of the neglect of small states is the difficulty of studying them. 
Given that the location of much sport studies research is in higher education 
institutions in large states there are few small states that have the research capacity 
(for example, universities with sports studies departments) to undertake research or 
to partner researchers from abroad. Furthermore, it is arguable that selecting the 
study of small states as university career direction is probably not a wise move as 
expertise in the policy of major states is likely to be more attractive to university 
appointments committees and to academic publishers: the study of small states has 
a small audience and one that is likely to remain small. A third explanation for the 
inertia in this area of study is the problem that the IR field has experienced in 
defining (and theorising) small states and the consequent attraction of moving on to 
other more amenable topics rather than address the definitional impasse and 
theoretical underdevelopment. 
 
Small states and the future of international sport 
 
Although it has been argued that there is a risk in over-emphasising the vulnerability 
of small states and underplaying their capacity there are trends in international sport 
that add a degree of urgency to the study of small states. The first is the globalising 
ambitions of the major international federations. The steady increase in the number 
of states participating in world championships puts at risk the success that some 
small states have managed to achieve in developing a niche sport such as Samoa, 
Tonga and even New Zealand in men’s rugby union, Slovenia and Croatia in men’s 
handball and Bulgaria and Cuba in men’s volleyball. If these and other ambitious 
sports are successful in attracting the major sports powers to embrace their sport 
then it may be more difficult for small states to preserve their niche position. A 
second trend which generally reinforces the ambitions of the international federations 
is the global objectives of the IOC. The steady growth in the number of states 
attending the summer Olympic Games has brought many small states into the 
Olympic Movement. The attraction of participation (even if only in the opening and 
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closing ceremonies) and of access to Olympic Solidarity funding has a significant 
effect on domestic sport policy. Most states, even the wealthy, adopt an elite sport 
policy that is heavily influenced, if not determined, by the decisions of the IOC on the 
sports to be included in the summer and winter Games. The homogenising effect of 
the dominance of the Olympic diet of sports is unlikely to benefit small states, but 
rather make it even harder for them to identify a niche where they can develop and 
sustain a competitive advantage (and the associated international profile in sport). A 
final pressure on the strategies of small states is the increase in expenditure of the 
medium and major sport powers on elite athlete development (Houlihan and Zheng 
2013) and particularly the increasing investment in sport science which may price 
many poorer countries out of an increasing range of sports. 
 
Despite these potential additional pressures that small states face in developing and 
operationalizing an effective sport strategy in pursuit of domestic and especially 
international political objectives there is sufficient evidence to suggest that small 
states can be adept at operating in the political and diplomatic interstices between 
the major powers. More systematic studies of the strategies and experiences of 
small states would not only enrich our understanding of sport policy processes in a 
distinctive and extensive group of states, but would also enrich our understanding of 
the interface between international sport and international relations beyond that of a 
narrow group of sports powers. 
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